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CAPITAL GAINS THROUGH REAL ESTATE
By JACQUES T. SCHLENGER* and
ROBERT C. EMBRY, JR.**
For one to be a prudent investor in our modern society with its
complex tax structure, it is not enough that he select a property which
may eventually be sold at a gain. He must also be aware of the tax
implications of his investment so that when it is disposed of he will
be entitled -to treat his profit as an investor's capital gain rather than
as a dealer's ordinary income. In preparing for such a result, the
corollary must always be kept in mind that if a loss is produced, this
prudent planning will backfire and produce a capital rather than an
ordinary loss.
For tax purposes, real estate investments may be divided into three
categories, the intent measured immediately prior to the sale determin-
ing placement in the respective category.' The category determines
how the gain or loss upon disposition of the real estate is to be treated.
The first category is that of "capital assets," defined in section
1221 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to include all property
except that held by a taxpayer and used in his trade or business, or
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business."
The second category consists of "Section 1231 Property."' This
is property 'held for more than six months and used in one's trade or
business, such as buildings and land. Real property held for rental is
also included, as the renting of real estate is considered the conduct of
a business if a minimum of time is devoted by the owner or his agents
to the management of the property.' Section 1231 property does not
include "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business. '
* B.S. 1948, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1951, Yale University; Partner,
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1. See Angvire, Capital Gains for the Wise Investor in Real Estate, 14 TUL.
TAX INST. 302 (1965); Primmer, Sales of Subdivided Realty - Capital Gains v.
Ordinary Income, 19 Sw. L.J. 116 (1965) ; Levin, Capital Gains or Income Tax on
Real Estate Sales, 37 B.U.L. R, v. 165 (1957) ; Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real
Estate - "Dealer" v. "Investor" Problems, 11 TAX L. RZv. 157 (1956).
2. In 1942, § 117(j) was added to the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 by ch. 619, 56 Stat.
846 (1942). (Now, INT. RtV. CODP OP 1954, § 1231). If the gains from sales, ex-
changes or involuntary conversions of "Property used in the trade or business" and
held for more than six months exceed the losses realized on similar dispositions of
such property, § 117(j) (now § 1231) permits the taxpayer to receive capital gains
benefits. If the losses exceed gains, the taxpayer is entitled to ordinary loss treatment.
But to qualify under this section, the property involved must not be "held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business."
3. Gilford v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953) (rental property oper-
ated by an agent). See cases cited in 5 CCH 1966 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1 4729.51,
where the rental of even one property may constitute the carrying on of a trade
or business.
4. See Workmen's Mut. Fire Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. A'Hearn, 286 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1961) ; Charles A. Foehl, Jr., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 418 (1961). Also relevant here
is section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides that no gain
"shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business or for
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The third category is property which is excluded by definition
from the two previous categories, i.e., "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business." Often, the tax-payer who holds such real property is re-
ferred as to a real estate dealer, as opposed to an investor, who may
hold either of the first two types of property, though these terms are
not used in the relevant statutes. Real estate falling into this third
category will produce ordinary income or ordinary loss upon its dis-
position. In contrast, upon the disposition of a "capital asset" held
for more than six months, any gain will be taxable as a long-term
capital gain. The same tax treatment results if the section 1231 gains
for the year exceed such losses. Thus, the essential question is whether
or not the property involved was held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business.'
Attempts by various courts to answer this question when consider-
ing varied fact situations have produced a plethora of imprecise and
contradictory statements. A definitional distinction often found is that
between the owner who buys with the thought of realizing long-term
appreciation in value and the owner who looks to an eventual sale
for the profit he seeks.6 The difficulty with this approach is that the
investor's appreciation in value can usually only be realized by a sale,
so he too is looking to an eventual sale for his profit. Such an
approach would nullify the statutory provisions conferring capital
gains treatment.7 Another distinction is the description of an investor
as one who acquires property for the income it will yield rather than
the profit he may obtain upon a resale.' This distinction has been re-
jected many times over by decisions holding property to be an invest-
ment though it generates no income while held by the owner.9
investment . . . is exchanged ... for property of a like kind. Two things should
be noted about this provision. First, among the items excluded from coverage is
"property held primarily for sale." This exclusion does not go on to add "to customers
in the ordinary course of a trade or business" as do the section 1221 and 1231 exclusions,
and is therefore arguably broader in coverage. Second, the regulations do not contain
a requirement that such exchanges be reported.
5. Section 206(a) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 233 (1921),
the first "capital gain" provision, explicitly excluded from its definition of capital
assets "stock in trade of a taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly
be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the first of the year." In
1924, the exception was extended by the addition of the words "or property held by
the taxpayer for sale in the course of his trade or business." Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, 43 Stat. 263, § 208(a) (8) (1924). The purpose of this change was to except
from capital gains treatment property held primarily for resale although not includible
in inventory. See John M. Welch, Sr., 19 B.T.A. 394, 398 (1930), modified, 59 F.2d
1085 (6th Cir. 1932). The present language was added by amendment in 1934, Revenue
Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 714, § 117(b), and now reads "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness." For a more complete legislative history, see MRTENs, FW1SRAZ INCOMS
TAXATION § 22.02 (1966).
6. "'A dealer, in the popular, and therefore in the statutory, sense of the word,
is not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again.'" In re
Hemming, 51 F.2d 850, 852 (S.D. Miss. 1931), quoting Norris Brothers v. Common-
wealth, 27 Pa. 494 (1856).
7. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965), on
remand, 46 T.C. 219 (1966) ; McGah v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1952),
on remand, 17 T.C. 1458 (1952), rev'd, 210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1954).
8. United States v. Chinook Investment Co., 136 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1943).
9. See Emilio Olivieri, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 920 (1966); William A. Belcher,
Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1 (1965).
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In practice, the courts do not rely on a definitional distinction
between investors and dealers; instead, they treat the question as one
of fact dependent on the status of the particular property and the
activity of the owner prior to sale. In resolving this question of fact,
a number of tests have been developed. Though each test contributes
to an answer, it has been stated that:
[I]n the final analysis . . . each case must be decided upon its
particular facts and the presence of any one or more of these
factors may or may not be determinative of a particular case. It
is rare indeed that one will find any precedent value in applying
the decision of one case to the facts of another case. At the most,
other cases decided by the courts on this subject may be persuasive
or suggestive of the approach of the courts to cases where the facts
may be somewhat similar.' °
Even with detailed factual inquiry, the judicial approach to the
investment-dealer distinction is usually too heavy-handed in its analysis.
There are several reasons why land increases in value, most of which
have nothing to do with the owner's activity. First, the mere passage
of time produces gain in an economy such as ours which is, at least in
recent times, mildly inflationary. The continuing increase in population
also contributes to higher land values as the years pass. Second, the
location of the land may increase its value if it is in the path of resi-
dential or commercial development or located over a mineral deposit.
Third, the development of new land uses or their increased feasibility
may increase land value. Finally, as a general rule, the value of a
tract per unit of measurement increases as its size decreases to lot
size." The value may then be further increased by activity on the part
of the seller such as improving the land or promoting its sale.
Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the courts separate those
elements of gain due to factors outside the owner's control and those
attributable to the owner's activity. 12 The decision is either all or
nothing. If the value of an owner's land has increased ninety per cent
because of the general market and the owner engages in subdivision
activities extensive enough to be described as a business which increases
the value an additional ten per cent, the whole gain is taxed at ordinary
income rates.
In broad terms, the law declares that an owner will fall into the
dealer class if he does either of two things, separately or in combina-
tion: (1) makes frequent and continuous sales of property which has
increased in value due to causes unconnected with the owner's activity,
or (2) engages in activities which increase the value of the land beyond
that which it had 'before .the activity was undertaken.
10. Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1959).
11. See Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Estate of Clinton C.
Millett, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 945 (1964); Allen Moore, 30 T.C. 1306, 1315 (1958);
Benjamin, REAL ESrAT AND TAXES, 18 Bull. of the Section of Taxation, ABA, pp.
8-9 (1965).
12. S. 0. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., concurring). See Surrey,
Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985, 990 (1956).
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The question being one of fact, there are various factors which
are considered by the courts as being of particular relevance.
1. THE PURPOSE OF ACQUISITION
Though the owner's purpose at time of sale is determinative, the
purpose for which the property was acquired is often given substantial
weight. The original purpose is deemed to continue unless the Internal
Revenue Service can show a subsequent change."3
In considering this factor, owners must be separated into those
who are dealers and those who are not. Generally, when a real estate
dealer acquires property, it is immediately treated as being part of his
inventory.'4 The court's first inquiry at the time of ultimate disposi-
tion almost certainly will be as to the owner's past involvement in real
estate transactions, whether prior to acquisition or merely prior to
sale.'" It is not likely that it will be helpful to the taxpayer that his
former dealings involved residential property while the sale under
consideration was of a commercial building;16 sales of realty appar-
ently are not differentiated for these purposes. Indeed, it was former
housing contractors, engaging in the rental of 'housing for the first
time during the war, who were deemed to have received ordinary in-
come from the post-war sale of the dwellings, largely because of their
former actiyities in building.'
To mitigate the effect of his status, the dealer may place himself
in a position of a non-dealer by (1) promptly segregating investment
property on his books from all inventory-type property,'8 (2) showing
that he acquired such property for a special and different intended use,
13. King v. Jackson, 48 Amer. Fed. Tax R. 1251 (W.D. Tex. 1954), rev'd, 223
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955), reconsidered, 51 Amer. Fed. Tax R. 1536 (W.D. Tex. 1956) ;
Albert Winnick, 17 T.C. 538 (1951), remanded per curiam, 199 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.
1952), reconsidered, 21 T.C. 1029 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.
1955) ; Victory Housing No. 2 Inc., 18 T.C. 466 (1952), rev'd, 205 F.2d 371 (10th
Cir. 1953).
14. Ralph A. Horton, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 899 (1954). "Real estate dealers
are not given specific opportunities under present law to segregate their personal
investments in real estate from their real estate business activities. Such segregation
is generally limited to occasional instances of inherited property or unrelated types of
real property investment." Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. p. 114 (1954).
A recent Tax Court decision appears to hold that a dealer may not realize capital
gain on property which he acquired solely with the view of making a profit on resale.
William A. Scheuber, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 559 (1966). This decision was reversed
in 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967). See text accompanying footnote 96 infra.
15. Greene v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
717 (1944); Factoria Land Co., 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 234 (1947). Contra, Phipps
v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1931), where the scope of authority was limited
to the taxable year in question.
16. Charles H. Black, Sr., 45 B.T.A. 204 (1941). See I. N. Burman, 23 B.T.A.
639 (1931).
17. King v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
829 (1951); Reuben Eckstrom, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 214 (1953); John P.
Dougherty, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 425 (1953). But see Ben L. Carroll, 21 B.T.A.
724 (1930), where the court gave capital gain treatment to a builder because of the
absence of former dealings in land per se.
18. Failure to segregate not only deprives the dealer of a strong capital gains
argument, but such failure itself tends strongly to dictate ordinary income treatment.
William S. Grimaldi, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 739 (1963) ; Hugh F. Little, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1954); F. R. McAbee, Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 633 (1953);
The Home Co., Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 741 (1953).
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and (3) not selling such property so frequently as to raise a question
as to whether the sales of such property amount to a regular business.
When, on the other hand, the non-dealer acquires property, he has
the advantage of the assumption that the property is not to be sold to
customers in the ordinary course of business because he does not have
a business. To tax any gain on the disposition of such property as
ordinary income, it must be shown that there was a change in status at
some earlier time so that the sale may be described as one to customers.
The grant by a government of -the power to deal in real estate is
sometimes considered. Courts have tended to dismiss powers granted
in a corporate charter 9 unless they are actually exercised.20 Powers
in a trust are treated like charter powers. If actively exercised, they
will contribute to an ordinary income determination. 2'
Where the owner acquires land for reasons unrelated to its profit
making potential, the courts will be more likely to hold it to be a
capital asset. Such a situation arises where an acquisition is the neces-
sary incident to another transaction,2 2 or is made to acquire land on
which to operate a business 23 (the subsequent sale being required by an
unforeseeable change of circumstances), or where the land is obtained
by a mortgagee on the foreclosure of his mortgage.
24
2. METHOD OF ACQUISITION
An extremely powerful indicator of an investment is the fact that
the acquisition of the property resulted from the unsolicited act of a
third party, often described as an "involuntary acquisition." Such a
situation arises where the land is acquired by inheritance, 25 or by gift26
(such an acquisition differs from one by inheritance in that the courts
19. Houston Deepwater Land Co. v. Scofield, 110 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. Tex. 1952) ;
W. B. Leedy & Co., Inc., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 861 (1952) ; South Texas Properties
Co., 16 T.C. 1003 (1951).
20. The Home Co., Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 741 (1953); Spanish Trail
Land Co., 10 T.C. 430 (1948).
21. See Welch v. Solomon, 99 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1938). See Chandler v. United
States, 121 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. I11. 1954), where a testamentary trust was set up to
administer realty bequeathed by the testator, a power to sell, in the absence of any
extensive sales activity, failed to preclude capital gains treatment. See also Helen Jane
Martina Schwerin Trust, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 202 (1954).
22. Norman A. Grant, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 771 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333
F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1964); Ralph J. Oace, 39 T.C. 743 (1963); Wellesley A. Ayling,
32 T.C. 704 (1959).
23. Carter-Colton Cigar Co., 9 T.C. 219 (1947).
24. Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1957);
Cebrian v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 412 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ; Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F.
Supp. 784 (W.D. Okla. 1947); Ethel M. Hauk, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 925 (1951);
Minnie Steinau Lowenberg, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 702 (1948); Kanawha Valley
Bank, 4 T.C. 252 (1944). But see White v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.
1949) (vacant lots acquired by a paving contractor upon foreclosure of paving liens
held "ordinary" assets); GCM 21497, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 187, amended by GCM
24910, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 101; GCM 26690, 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 28; Spanish Trail
Land Co., 10 T.C. 430 (1948).
25. Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931(4th Cir. 1955); Estate of William D. Mundy, 36 T.C. 703 (1961); Estate of
Josephine C. Simpson, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 371 (1962); Estate of Samuel B.
Walton, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 346 (1962); Allen Moore, 30 T.C. 1306 (1958).26. Allen Moore, 30 T.C. 1306 (1958) ; Sparks v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 941
(M.D. Ga. 1944).
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appear more ready to attribute to the new owner the activities of the
former owner).27 Evidently the transfer of the land by the recipient
to a trust or a corporation does not affect the mitigating influence of
the original involuntary acquisition. 2
Almost invariably, land acquired by inheritance stands a good
chance for capital-asset classification when it is resold, often regard-
less of the volume involved,29 or the presence of fairly substantial
development,8" or sales activity, or both,3 ' and regardless of the tax-
payer's prior real estate involvement. In all cases where liquidation
is claimed, however, the owner's case is weakened if the proceeds of
the sale in question are used to purchase other real estate.32
The method of financing an acquisition may also be important.
Though no case appears to explicitly rely on this factor, most decisions
imply its relevance by referring to the terms of the financing. This
probably indicates that a purchase inadequately financed for long-term
retention of the property (that is, financed through an obviously ex-
cessive interest charge or with an insignificant down payment on prop-
erty which is not income producing) was purchased for prompt resale.
3. THE LENGTH OF THE HOLDING PERIOD
As a general rule, the longer a tract is held, the more likely it will
be held to be an investment. A short holding period3 3 or the sale of
a house immediately upon completion and without prior rental3 4 will
contribute to the conclusion that the sales proceeds be taxed at ordi-
nary rates. When, however, a property owner dies, the party receiv-
ing the property from the decedent obtains a stepped up basis equal to
the property's fair market value, and thus the question of length of
holding period is rendered academic.33
The six-month statutory holding period has no probative value,
however, for it is a prerequisite before consideration can even begin
27. Bistline v. United States, 260 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1958).
28. Allen Moore, 30 T.C. 1306 (1958) (trust).
29. Riedel v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Camp v. Murray,
226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Robinson, 129 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942) ;
Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954) ; Dagmar Gruy, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
787 (1949).
30. Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Daniel W. Ellis, 13 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 15 (1954). The Sixth Circuit has adopted the view that where a person can
only dispose of inherited land advantageously by having it sold in smaller parcels
through a dealer who, to make the property salable, builds an access road, capital
gains treatment cannot be denied. Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir.
1958) ; Clark v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Tenn. 1961) ; Estate of Samuel
B. Walton, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 346 (1962).
31. Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947); Estate of
Josephine Clay Simpson, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 371 (1962).
32. J. Stewart Matthews, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1058 (1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d
101 (6th Cir. 1963).
33. Mathews v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1963); Starke v. Com-
missioner, 312 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1963); Wineberg v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157(9th Cir. 1963); Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Sylvester
A. Lowery, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 152 (1964) ; Abe Pickus, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1791 (1963) ; James G. Hoover, 32 T.C. 618 (1959).
34. San Jacinto Homes, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1089 (1952) ; Russ Prater, Inc.,
11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1952).
35. INT. REv. COog OV 1954, § 1014 [hereinafter 1954 Code is referred to only
by section].
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as to whether the owner is an investor. 8 To be of positive relevance,
the holding period generally has to be too substantial a number of
years to be availed of by a developer who seeks his profit from im-
provements rather than a general rise in land values.3 7  However,
where a holding period is forced upon the taxpayer by government
restrictions against sale, 8 or by an economically depressed market, 9
its length does not encourage capital gain treatment.
4. THE USE AND AVAILABILITY OF PROPERTY
Related to the length of holding factor is the nature of the owner's
use of the property. Even if the land is purchased, if in addition it is
held for several years to produce income, as from ranching or orchard
operations, a capital gain would more likely result.4"
Another factor is the availability of the property for sale. Where
the property is held for rental, a lease which facilitates sale by the lessor
may negative the investment aspects of the rental activities. This
result is true where the lease is short-term,41 or contains an option
to purchase,42 and especially where the option to purchase permits the
buyer to apply his rental payments against the purchase price.43 In
the absence of an option to purchase, making sales to tenants is not
necessarily inconsistent with the liquidation of an investment.44
If the taxpayer acquires only an option to purchase the land and
then sells the option, not only is the sale treated in the same manner
as if the owner had acquired and then sold the land, but the fact that
an option was obtained indicates a purpose to resell.45
36. This test is to distinguish the investor from the speculator. Sen. Rep. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1941) ; Miller, The Capital Asset Concept, 59 YAtX L.J. 837,
839 (1950).
37. Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952) (31 years)(taxed as ordinary income); Hariss v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944)(13 years); Martin Dressen, 17 T.C. 1443 (1952) (15 years). See also Curtis Co.,
23 T.C. 740 (1955), where an investment intent was found from an average holding
period of three years. But this factor is not conclusive. See Yara Engineering Corp.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1448 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1965)
(20 years).
38. Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 Ft2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951)- F. R.
McAbee, Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 633 (1953); Reuben Eckstrom, 12 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 214 (1953).
39. Ambassador, Inc., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 974 (1952); Factoria Land Co.,
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 234 (1947). The courts have ignored without comment the
fact that an absence of sales activity was attributable to a depressed market. Dunlap
v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950); Ethel M. Hauk, 10 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 925 (1951).
40. Dean, Tax Aspects of Real Estate Development, 18 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 137,
141 (1960). See Hariss v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944); Wineman
Realty Co., 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 791 (1943).
41. Factoria Land Co., 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 234 (1947).
42. Pacific Homes, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956); Louis
Rubino v. Commissioner, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1095 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 186
F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 814 (1951).
43. Homann v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1956).
44. Clyde H. Laper, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1951).
45. Norman A. Grant, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 771 (1963), aff'd per curiam,
333 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1964). But see Ralph F. Gordy, 36 T.C. 855 (1961), where
the option aspect was disregarded. Query: Would not the same adverse inference be
drawn if contracts to purchase were sold before settlement?
1967]
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5. OCCUPATION OF THE HOLDER
The owner is helped for capital gain purposes - but not insu-
lated - by being engaged in another business or profession.46 Strangely
enough, whether this other profession is in real estate activities other
than subdivision or -in a completely non-real estate area of activity
does not seem to matter.
It has been repeatedly held, however, that a property owner may
be in more than one ,business.47 He may be in the business of selling
real estate even though that is not his only business or even his principal
business.48 Even if the owner is completely passive, he may be held to
be a dealer if there is a seller's market and the volume of his sales is
frequent and continuous.49 As a general rule, however, the less time
the owner devotes to the land (other than producing income from it),
the more likely it is that property sold by him will be classified as a
capital asset.5" A real estate dealer can conduct his business without
an office or employees or the other indices which are normal to the
carrying on of a business.51
If the owner holds a real estate broker's license, he has a substan-
tially greater burden than other taxpayers in establishing that he is
an investor with respect to specific assets. A broker may have pur-
chased the property for others, for 'resale at a profit, or as a permanent
investment. The burden is on the 'broker to prove in which capacity
he acted. At a minimum, a broker must keep separate accounts and
avoid treating expenses attributable thereto as reducing earnings from
activities as a real estate dealer. 2 Though it 'is difficult, it is never-
theless possible for a dealer to make an investment in real estate and
realize a capital gain on its disposition.5
6. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROPERTY
Again, as a general rule, the owner is more likely to obtain capital
gain treatment if he does not make any improvements on the tract
which increase the marketability of the land and thereby indicate an
46. Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959) (lawyer); Camp v.
Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955) (corporate executive) ; Ross v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955) (lawyer); Daniel W. Ellis, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 15
(1954) (doctor and professor of medicine).
47. Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952) (attorney); Julian
Ross, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 974 (1954), rev'd, 227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955)
(attorney).
48. Crosswhite v. United States, 369 F.2d 898 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; S. 0. Bynum, 46
T.C. 295 (1966).
49. Real Estate Corp., Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 654 (1963) ; Yara Engineer-
ing Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1448 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1965).
50. Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 345 (D. Md. 1966).
51. William H. Miller, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1070 (1962).
52. The Self-Employment Tax Regulations provide that real estate dealers should
include gain, losses and rentals derived from real estate held for sale to customers
while excluding expenses on property that is held for speculation or investment. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(a) (1963).
53. Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Louis Lesser, 42
T.C. 688 (1964). But see White v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1949).
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intention to sell to customers.54 Such improvements include not only
subdivision activity5 but also activity in the clearing of title and re-
moval of liens.56 The probative value of the improvements as showing
a business may be neutralized if required by municipal ordinance as a
prerequisite to sale by lots. 7
The improvement and subdivision of part of a tract does not
necessarily taint the whole tract."5 Unimproved land remaining in the
tract may be disposed of at capital gain rates unless the owner is also
found to be dealing in such large unimproved tracts. 9 But there is a
risk that subdivision activity will 'bring a determination of dealership
status as to a different piece of property otherwise taxable at capital
gains rates,60 just as a taxpayer's prior activities may foredoom his
future sales to ordinary income treatment. In addition, if a tract is
improved and subdivided for sale to customers, the sale of it in bulk
will produce ordinary income..
Improvements and subdivision have been permitted without affect-
ing investment status where such activity is seen as a reasonable and
accepted means of disposing of investment property." The Internal
Revenue Service, however, does not accept this distinction. 63 Further-
more, as soon as other dealer characteristics are added, the owner will
usually be held to have realized ordinary income from the sale.64
The foregoing discussion assumed that the owner did the sub-
dividing. Where, however, the taxpayer acquires the property already
subdivided, generally the fact of subdivision will be neutralized as a
factor adverse to capital gains treatment,6 5 even if the subdivided land
54. The size of the investment in improvements Will be considered, William A.Scheuber, 20 UCCTCM 282 (1961). Courts may compare the cost of the improve-
ments to the cost of the land to determine how significant the improvement is.Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1958). An exception is found
where the improvements increase the present income from the property. Such im-provements may include buildings to be rented or access roads to portions of the tract
to be rented, particularly if the primary use is for rental purposes. Note that rentalproperties themselves can be held primarily for sale to customers. If rental properties
are not held primarily for sale to customers, an agent's management of rental prop-
erties causes the rental business to be attributed to the owner, which can be helpful
to reduce the owner's dealership hazard from ownership of other tracts. Benjamin,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 14.
55. Maxine Development Co., Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1579 (1963). The
mere platting of land may prove determinative. See Thomas W. Nevin, 24 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 294 (1965).
56. William H. Miller, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1070, 1075 (1962).57. Oahu Sugar Co. v. U.S., 300 F.2d 773, 777-78 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Harold C.Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 232 (1961); Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C. 704 (1959).58. J. 0. Chapman, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 604 (1944); Alexander Weil, 3 CCHTax Ct. Mem. 528 (1944); Rev. Rul. 57-565, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 546.
59. J. Kirby Reppell, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 295 (1961); Stanley H. Klarkowski,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1827 (1965).
60. George Wibbelsman, 12 T.C. 1022 (1949).
61. Donald J. Lawrie, 36 T.C. 1117 (1961).
62. Estate of Barrios v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959).
63. Rev. Rul. 59-91, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 15.64. Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963) (prompt sub-division and substantial real estate activities) ; Murray v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 137(10th Cir. 1956) (subdivision one year after acquisition) ; Shearer v. Smyth, 116 F.Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 840 (subdivision by real estate agents).




contain substantial improvements when acquired.6" Moreover, the
owner who purchases land already subdivided may be allowed more
extensive improvement than if he himself had done the subdividing.17
There is also a limited statutory exception to this general rule
that subdivision improvements hurt the taxpayer's chances for capital
gains treatment. Often an owner, to dispose of real estate which has
been held as an investment, finds it necessary to subdivide or engage
in some other activity in order to liquidate in a satisfactory manner.
Section 1237 was enacted primarily to deal with this situation by
permitting a taxpayer "who is not otherwise a dealer ... to dispose
of a tract of real property, held for investment purposes, by subdividing
it without necessarily being treated as a real estate dealer. ' 6  If the
requirements of this section are met, an owner does not become a
"dealer" merely by reason of subdivision.
The protection of this section is of use primarily where the tax-
payer is a noncorporate taxpayer,69 which means an individual, a part-
nership, a trust or an estate.7° Certain principal requirements must
be met by an owner to qualify for section 1237 treatment: (a) he
must not have held any part of the tract at any time for sale to cus-
tomers, nor can any other property have been so held during the year
in question; (b) no improvements which substantially increase the
value of the lot sold can have occurred ;71 and (c) he must have owned
the land for five years unless inherited. If these requirements are met,
then the gain on the sale of the lots is taxed at a special rate.72 This
treatment is available even though the owner 'has subdivided the tract
and engaged in extensive selling activity. 7 Failure to meet the require-
ments, however, does not necessarily mean that the property is being
held for sale to customers. 74
The utility of this section is extremely limited. What it does, in
effect, is to provide that two factors, sub-division and sales activity, may
no longer be the sole support for a finding that the owner was in the busi-
ness of selling real estate. But few cases rely on these factors alone. 75
66. Minnie Steinau Loewenberg, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 702 (1948) (streets,
sidewalks, utilities) ; Ben L. Carroll, 21 B.T.A. 724 (1930) (streets, water, sewerage,
buildings).
67. Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950); Beatrice
Brenneman, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 628 (1952) ; Freida E. J. Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946).
68. Hvidsten v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 856 (D.N.D. 1960).
69. Corporations are eligible only if they meet certain additional requirements:
(1) neither the corporation nor its stockholders may directly or indirectly hold real
estate for sale to customers; and (2) the property must have been originally acquired
through foreclosure of a lien thereon.
70. See Estate of Peter Finder, 37 T.C. 411 (1961).
71. An improvement is deemed to have been made by the owner if made by mem-
bers of his family (see § 267(c) (4)), by a corporation controlled by the owner, by
a partnership in which the owner is a partner, by a lessee if the improvement con-
stitutes income to the owner, or by a public body if it constitutes an addition to the
owner's basis.
72. If more than five lots contained in the same tract are sold or exchanged and
the section otherwise applies, the gain is taxed as ordinary income to the extent of
five per cent of the selling price. § 1237(b) (1).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (2).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (4).
75. See Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate - "Dealer" v. "Investor" Problem,
11 TAx L. Rtv. 157, 165 (1956) and Hirsch, Income Tax Changes Affecting Real
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7. PROPERTY HOLDING ENTITIES
A. Corporations
It may be possible to obtain capital gains treatment by use of a
corporation. The mere fact that the land is the only asset of the cor-
poration does not mean it is being held for sale to customers.76 Incor-
porating may insulate the tract from the stockholder's dealer status ;77
conversely, it may insulate the non-dealer stockholder from his con-
trolled corporation's activities in making improvements, advertising
and generally holding -the property for sale to customers.78 It may also
be useful in permitting the owner to sell in one non-business trans-
action to a single buyer, the corporation, thus realizing a capital gain.
The corporation could then improve and subdivide the property with
only the value added by the corporation taxed as ordinary income.
Such a transaction is, of course, helpful only where the the owner is
not in the business of selling large undeveloped tracts, for in such a
situation his own corporation would be just as much a customer as
any other buyer. Where this is not the case, the use of a corporation
to develop the land should be a permissible device because the owner
is adding the additional distinction needed but not found in the tax
law. In other words, he is paying a capital gain on the appreciation
in value due to general market conditions when the property is trans-
ferred to his corporation and then paying an ordinary income tax as
to the value added by -the corporation's business activity.79
If the owner is a dealer, then he might use the tax free transfer
provisions of section 351 to pass the property to a corporation which
would in turn hold it as its value increases, carefully avoiding any
activity that might raise the question of collapsilbility. If the corpora-
tion does not actively attempt to sell the land, it should be able to
realize a capital gain on disposition."0 There must, however, be a valid
Property, 32 TAXES 739, 747 (1954), for an extensive discussion of the limitations
of this section.
76. Harchester Realty Corp., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 922 (1961).
77. There is substantial risk, however, that when a dealer transfers property to
a newly formed corporation which then sells it, that the corporation will be deemed
collapsible. Guy A. Van Heusden, 44 T.C. 491 (1965). The regulations under section
1237 also indicate that if the stockholder held the property for sale to customers and
transferred it to a corporation in a transaction under which the corporation's basis is
determined by reference to the stockholder's basis, then the corporation will be seen as
holding the land for that purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237(b) (3).
78. George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. - (1966); Robert Binda, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1195 (1963); Ralph E. Gordy, 36 T.C. 855 (1961). But see William S.
Grimaldi, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 739 (1963). See Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. United
States 259 F. Supp. 345 (D. Md. 1966), where a non-dealer corporation realized
capital gains on the sale of 21 properties to a dealer corporation owned by the
same parties.
79. Sections 269 and 1551, and section 357 if the tract is subject to any liability,
require some business purpose as the only or at least the principal or major purpose
for the corporation's existence, other than just to hold the tract. In addition, section
357 will cause the taxpayer to have income upon the formation of a controlled cor-
poration without regard to purpose, to the extent that the liabilities to which the land
is subject exceed the owner's basis for the tract. This of course will not be a factor
when the transfer is structured so as to avoid section 351 and recognize a gain.
80. Houston Deepwater Land Co. v. Scofield, 110 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
It was there held that just because the corporation has no other business, it does not
mean that it is in the business of selling land unless there is a sufficient amount of
activity to justify a finding of business.
19671
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
business purpose behind the transaction in order that some function
is 'served by the corporation's existence, or it may be disregarded as
a part of a pre-arranged plan, the purpose of which is the sale of the
property to a third party. In such a case, if the stock is sold, the pro-
ceeds may be held to represent proceeds from the sale of the property
itself.8 ' In the Jacobs case, 2 the taxpayer went through all the formal
steps of activating a dormant corporation, transferring real property
in exchange solely for the stock of the corporation and then selling the
stock to a third party anxious to acquire the land. Because the trans-
action was all part of a pre-arranged plan, the corporate entity was
disregarded and was held to be only a conduit through which the tax-
payer was enabled to effect the sale of his property in the ordinary
course of his real estate business.
While the investor's position is strengthened by avoiding develop-
ment and sale activities, care should be exercised to separate the activi-
ties of the corporation in order to avoid the argument that the cor-
poration is not to be held the agent of the shareholders so as to place
them in the real estate business. There is a great wealth of authority
both attributing and refusing -to attribute to the individual taxpayer
the activities of the corporation in which he is or was a stockholder.
The older authority refuses to make such attribution." More recent
cases, without specifically considering the question, have lumped cor-
porate and individual activities into one ball of wax."
In Tibbals v. United States,5 the owner purchased a tract of land
already subdivided into lots. He actively solicited the county to im-
prove or provide water, sewer and street facilities for the land. Two
years later, he 'sold 100 lots to one of 'his corporations, which pro-
ceeded to develop and sell them to customers. This sale to the cor-
poration was held to produce ordinary income though a subsequent
sale to an unrelated corporation of another large group of lots pro-
duced a capital gain. The majority held that where the owner had
engaged in substantial development activities of his own, a conveyance
to a controlled corporation which continued development would pro-
duce an ordinary gain. In permitting capital treatment of the later
sale, it was held that the owner had narrowed his development plans
to the lots already sold to the controlled corporations. Though the
opinion specifically stated that it had not attributed the corporation's
activity to the shareholder, the dissent read the opinion as doing just
that and vigorously protested.
81. Virginia W. Stettinius Dudley, 32 T.C. 564 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 279
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1960).
82. 21 T.C. 165 (1954), aff'd, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
83. Phipps v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1931) ; 512 West 56th Street
Corp., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 53 (1945), aff'd, 151 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1945); Julius
Goodman, 40 B.T.A. 22 (1939); Peter Miller, 20 B.T.A. 230 (1930).
84. Eugene L. Freeland, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1473 (1966); Ralph A. Horton,
13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 899 (1954); F. R. McAbee, Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 633(1953) ; Estate of Alice Kleberg, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 858 (1946). But see Morse
v. United States, 371 F.2d 474 (Ct. CI. 1967); Winding River Ranch, Inc., 25 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1335 (1966).
85. 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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The majority's disclaimer and prior decisions specifically holding
that the sale by an owner who is not a dealer to a wholly-owned dealer
corporation 'will produce a capital gain8" would support the view that
attribution of corporate activity to the shareholder is not proper and
.thus indicates that this decision has not changed the law. However,
it was clear in this case that the owner was a dealer in real estate in
his own right. The puzzle comes from the favorable holding that the
sale to the unrelated corporation was a capital transaction because the
owner no longer looked to development of the land.
B. Trust
The owner may be helped in his effort to obtain capital gain treat-
ment ,by placing the property in a trust. Such a step may insulate
the tract from the grantor's (and the beneficiary's) dealer status, but
the courts are not reluctant to disregard the trust."' Perhaps the best
reason for placing the land in a trust is to insulate the non-dealer owner
(grantor) from dealership status by providing that a real estate
broker, who purports to act as an independent contractor and trustee,
has the complete control in subdividing the land. However, the crea-
tion of an irrevocable trust causes a gift tax to be incurred by the
grantor in all but the unusual situation of the grantor's reservation of
all possible benefits from the trust.
C. Partnership
Problems similar to those occurring when a corporation or trust
is employed are found when an owner participates in a partnership
which in turn engages in land transactions.8  To start with a point of
certainty in this confused area of the law, it is clear that the partner-
ship activities of one partner will be attributed to all of the other
partners no -matter how passive they might be.89 The same principle
applies to joint venturers. °
The difficult question is whether the status of the individual
partners in their non-partnership activities is attributed to the partner-
86. Ralph E. Gordy, 36 T.C. 855 (1961).
87. See B. B. Margolis, 337 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Stanley H. Klarkowski,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1827 (1965).
88. Joint owners may be helped for capital gains purposes by taking a tract in
co-ownership, rather than as partners. Joint ownership is ordinarily a partnership for
tax purposes. However, any partnership for tax purposes is referred to in the Code
as by definition carrying on a business, financial operation, or business venture. If an
unimproved tract is acquired by a group for investment only, the only business likely
to be imputed to the group would be the holding of the tract for sale. To negate any
such business inference, co-owners can elect not to be a partnership for tax purposes
under section 761 (a) (1), if the co-ownership is availed of for investment purposes
only and not for active conduct of a business and if the income of each co-owner can
be adequately determined separately. Benjamin, op. cit. supra note 11, at 16.
89. Hugh F. Little, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1954); Frederick L. Meagher,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 609 (1953). It has been held that the activity of a corporation
owned by one of the partners will be imputed to the other partners where the cor-
poration purchases land from the partnership and develops it. Eugene L. Freeland,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1473 (1966); Neils Schultz, 44 B.T.A. 146 (1941).
90. Edward Pool, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 296 (1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 233 (9th




ship. In other words, if a non-dealer and a dealer contribute land to
a partnership which makes one sale, how is the gain taxed? There is
no clear answer to this question." Section 702(b) provides that the
character of the -income" in the hands of the partner shall be the same
as if it had been realized by the partner directly from the source from
which it was realized by -the partnership. This language appears to
mean that the character of the income is fixed by reference to the busi-
ness of the partner rather than that of the partnership. Thus, under
this interpretation, the dealer-partner would receive ordinary income
from the partnership even though the partnership is not a dealer.
Neither the Congressional Committee Reports nor the regulations
shed any light on the section's meaning. 3 An example in the regula-
tions, however, fixes the character at the partnership level without
reference to the partners' status. 4 This has led some commentators
to conclude that the character is determined at the partnership level. 5
Thus, under this interpretation, it would be capital gain.
A recent case is of interest. The Tax Court in Louis J. Kersch"6
indicated that the activity of the partners outside the partnership was
not to be attributed to the partnership. There a real estate dealer
joined with another dealer, with whom he had associated before in other
real estate ventures, and a non-dealer to purchase vacant land for in-
dustrial use. The land was held for two years and sold, and the court
held the profit taxable at capital gains rates. The court noted that
this was the only transaction undertaken by the partnership. The force
of the opinion on the point here at issue was weakened somewhat by
the court's reference to the fact that none of the partners had ever
dealt in industrial lands previously.
8. PROPERTY HELD PRIMARILY FOR THE SALE
To CUSTOMERS - Malat v. Riddell
The statutory exclusion from capital gains treatment is not prop-
erty held for sale -to customers but property held primarily for such
91. George I. Bauman, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1064 (1964). See Wolfman,
Level for Determining Character of Partnership Income - "Entity" v. "Conduit"
Principle in Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 287, 292 (1961); McDonald,
Income Taxation of Partnerships - A Critique, 44 VA. L. Rzv. 903 (195§). See also
Horace E. Oliver, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 67 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 352
(5th Cir. 1955) (court assumed all land held by partnership is stock in trade) ; Harry
Simberg, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 477 (1954) (court looked only to activity of the
partner before the court and did not consider that of other partners or of the partner-
ship alone).
92. Those items of income specified in section 702(a).
93. See WILLIS, HANDBOOK Ol PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 39 (1957), where ALI
comments on the draft which led to the statute indicate the character is fixed at the
partnership level.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b).
95. See WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 93. Legislation was proposed in 1959 which
would have amended section 702(b) to clearly provide that the character should be
determined at the partner level. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1959); H.R.
Rep. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. on Ways and Means, p. 21 (1959). See
RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIPT AND ESTATE TAXATION 16.07(13)
(1954).
96. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 89 (1961). See George W. Mitchell, 37 T.C .........(1966).
[VOL. XXVII
CAPITAL GAINS THROUGH REAL ESTATE
sale. Courts have given differing interpretations to this concept, some
holding that it meant that sale need only be a "substantial" purposep'
while others read it as meaning "principally."98 This dispute was
resolved last term by the United States Supreme Court in Malat v.
Riddell which accepted the latter definition that property is held pri-
marily for sale to customers only if that is the "principal" purpose or
the one "of first importance."99 The Court noted that the distinction
was between profits arising from everyday 'business operations, on the
one hand, and the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a
substantial period of time, on the other.
In that case, the taxpayer, a member of a partnership developing
rental properties, entered into a joint venture with four individuals
to purchase 45 acres of agriculturally zoned land fronting on two
boulevards. The other four joint venturers were engaged in various
real estate activities. It was the hope and expectation of the venturers
that the land could be improved by a garden-type rental development,
but they were unable to finance it. The purchase and all of the sales
were made in 1954.
When it was determined that financing was unavailable and be-
cause the carrying costs of the land were onerous, an interior tract
was subdivided, improved by streets and sewers, and distributed to
the partners, who conveyed it to another joint venture, which in turn
sold the lots to the public. The gain on the sale of this land was re-
ported as ordinary income. The original joint venture retained the land
bordering on the main thoroughfares in the hope of changing the zon-
ing to commercial and developing it accordingly. This hope also proved
groundless, and, when discord divided the partners, the remaining tract
was sold to two purchasers, one an unrelated developer and the other
a joint venture formed by two of the partners to develop the land.
These partners were also developers. It was on this sale that the
sellers claimed capital gains.
The District Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, ruled that the gain on this sale was ordinary income
because the owner had two purposes in acquiring the land, to either
rent or sell it. Such being the case, sale was a "substantial" purpose.
The 'Court of Appeals distinguished this case from one where the owner
intends to rent, and if that proves unprofitable, then to liquidate. Here,
the Court felt that the owners were ready to follow any alternative
that produced the most profit. The Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, holding that sale must be the "principal," not just a "substan-
tial," purpose. On remand, the District Court held that the owner
was entitled to capital gain treatment. The net result of this decision
is that a rental developer joined in a venture with dealers, developed
part of a tract for sale to customers, then sold the remainder to two
97. American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604, 605 (2d Cir. 1963);
Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1951).
98. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410, 411 (5th Cir. 1951).
99. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
1967]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
developers, one of whom was a joint venture made up of two of the
partners, and yet received capital gains treatment. 100
9. METHOD OF DIsPOsrTION
The statutory exception to capital gains treatment provides not
only that the land be held "primarily for sale," a subjective test look-
ing to the intent of the owner, but also that the contemplated sale
be to customers in the ordinary course of business. This second, more
objective, test is concerned with whether the activities of the owner
in disposing of propery amount to a business. To determine this, the
courts look to the extent of sales activity, the frequency and continuity
of the sales, the substantiality of the sales when compared to the
owner's other business, and the extent to which the owner has en-
gaged in other real estate dealings. These indicators of a business will
be considered below.
A. Sales Activity
The surest way to lose a capital gain is to engage in extensive
sales activities. Possible sales activities include maintaining a sales
office,' 1 - sales staff, advertising,0 2 placing "For Sale" signs on the
property'03 and listing the property with licensed real estate brokers.
If an owner desires to dispose of his property, he has several routes
open to ,him: he may remain passive and wait for an acceptable offer,
carry on sales activity himself, hire an agent, enter into a joint venture
with a dealer, or list the property with an independent broker. The
use of any but the first alternative raises the risk of losing capital
gain status.
The next most prudent technique is to place the property in the
hands of a broker who assumes complete control over sale of the land.
The risk here is that the broker's activity will be imputed to the owner,
which will happen unless the owner minimizes all incidents of control
and supervision. In Boomhower v. United States,04 the owner turned
the land over to a lumber company which built the houses, sold the
land, and paid the owner a certain amount per lot sold. It was held
100. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).On remand, the land was found not to be held primarily for sale to customers, 66-2U.S. Tax Cas. f 9613 (S.D. Cal. 1966).101. See Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938); Arthur E. Wood,
25 T.C. 468 (1955).
102. See Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 116 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. Tex. 1953), aff'd,
218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954).
103. See George v. Sottong, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366 (1966) ; Palos Verdes
Corp. v. United States, 201 F2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952).104. 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947). The same result was reached in Camp v.Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955). It has been held that where the owner in fact
exercised no control, it was not crucial that he had the power to control. Voss v.United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964). The owner's experience is relevant.Glienke v. United States, 14 Amer. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5555 (S.D. Ill. 1964). Also
consider who pays for the improvements and supervises sales. J. G. Mendoza, 22CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 528 (1963). And consider who fixed the price and size of thelots. Houghten v. United States, 11 Amer. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 1963);Estate of Samuel B. Walton, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 346 (1962); Estate of William
D. Mundy, 36 T.C. 703 (1961).
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that the builder's activity could not be imputed to the owner., Other
decisions have attributed the seller's activities to the owner where the
seller was seen as the owner's agent. 10 6 Another risk is that the owner
may be held to be a joint venturer with the broker whose activities
will be attributed to him. 1 7 Furthermore, since the work is being
done for the owner's benefit regardless of the form of contract signed,
it is questionable how long capital 'gains treatment based on lack of
control will continue to be recognized.
B. Frequency and Continuity
The word "business" is often read by the courts as "busyness,"
thereby implying that if an owner is busy selling land, he must be in
the 'business of doing so. Early decisions relied on this factor almost
exclusively.'08 More recent Ninth Circuit decisions have continued
this emphasis.'09
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has questioned the validity
of the frequency and continuity test in liquidation cases by reasoning
that, if a taxpayer intends to dispose of a large amount of property,
it is only natural to expect that there will be a great number of sales
in a relatively short period of time." 0 If there is no showing of either
sales activity by the owner himself or of an intent to hold the property
primarily for sale, the frequency factor should not by itself require
ordinary income treatment. In addition, several cases hold that fre-
quent or continuous sales do not transform the owner into a dealer
if development and sales activities are lacking."'
It is still advisable, however, to sell the tract as a whole, thereby
reducing the frequency-of-sales factor." 2 The mere fact of fragmenta-
tion by subdivision is often held to indicate that the property is being
105. The "reluctancy" principle was discussed in Municipal Bond Corporation,
46 T.C. 219 (1966).
106. Nadalin v. United States, 364 F.2d 431 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; Bauschard v. Com-
missioner, 31 T.C. 910 (1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Ehrman v. Com-
missioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941) ; James H. Merritt, Sr., 47 T.C. -_ (1967) ;
John Nadalin, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 73 (1967); Floyd L. Freberg, 23 CCH TaxCt Mem. 784 (1964). But see Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
107. Ackerman v. United States, 335 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1964) ; W. E. Anderson,23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1170 (1964) ; Bauschard v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 910 (1959);
Walter H. Kaltreider, 28 T.C. 121 (1957).
108. 512 West Fifty-Sixth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1945);Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941); Snell v. Commissioner, 97
F2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
109. Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Rolling-
wood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
110. Smith v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1956); Goldberg v. Com-
missioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955).
111. Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959); Ralph J. Oace, 39T.C. 743 (1963); Allen Moore, 30 T.C. 1306 (1958). But see Yara Engineering
Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1448 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1965).
112. George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120 (1966). See Gardens of Faith, Inc., 23CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1045 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965). See also Winding River Ranch, Inc., 25 CCHTax Ct. Mem. 1335 (1966), where capital gain treatment was accorded a sale in
which the buyer was allowed to pay for and obtain small portions of the tract over
an extended period of time.
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held for sale or that there is a business."' But the reverse situation
often leads to the same result; that is, the acquisition of small parcels
which are combined into a large tract may be seen as being advan-
tageous to a certain class of purchasers, and the owners may be held
to be in the business of making such sales."'
It is difficult to determine what is considered frequent and con-
tinuous and what is sporadic. The sale of 24 lots in three years has
been held too frequent to qualify for capital gains treatment," 5 while
the sale of 90 houses in one year has not been considered excessive." 6
Both the Commissioner and the owner can find generous support in
the many decisions for holding a certain number of sales to be either
frequent or casual. The one certain thing is that the more the owner
can reduce the number of sales and space their occurrence, the more
likely he is to attain capital gain treatment.
C. Substantiality of Sales in Relation
to Principal Business
In determining 'how busy an owner is in disposing of his land,
many courts measure his income from'1 and time spent" 8 in the sale
of real property against the amount of those measures involved in his
other occupation. Again, there is no formula or bright line that is
universally accepted. Nor should these two factors, relative income
and time spent, be given equal weight. Although it must be recognized
that a taxpayer may be in more than one business at any point in
time," 9 not every activity is a business within the meaning of section
1221. It is reasonable to conclude that one who spends a major por-
tion of his time selling real estate is in that business. It is not so clear
that a person who receives a major portion of his income from such
113. Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1962). When property is
sold in lots or sections, any one sale may be the first or last in a sales program and
therefore the number of sales prior to, during and subsequent to the tax year in
question are subject to inquiry. Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir. 1963).
114. Stockton Harbor Industrial Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1954).
115. Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960). Similarly nine trans-
actions in five years has been deemed a business. George v. Sottong, 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1366 (1966). The size of the property being sold is of course relevant in
determining whether the sales are frequent. Charles R. Kines, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1561 (1961).
116. Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955). See Wibbelsman,
12 T.C. 1022 (1949) (seven sales were too many) ; Fabs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315(5th Cir. 1947) (95 in two years was moderate).
117. Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); L. P. Barney,
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109 (1967). See Real Estate Corporation, 301 F.2d 423 (10th
Cir. 1962), where a comparison of net income was considered more relevant than a
comparison of gross receipts. Harold C. Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 232 (1961).
118. In Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 345 (D. Md. 1966),
the taxpayer was an accoustical engineering firm. For over 20 years it invested excess
funds in real estate. During this period there were 84 sales. The gain on these sales
was held to be capital, the court noting that one officer dedicated less than 1 per cent
of his time to land transactions. None of the land was improved and there was no
advertising. Query: What effect would such a ruling have on the defense to a charge
that excess funds have been unreasonably accumulated under § 531, I.R.C. 1954?
119. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952); Fahs v. Crawford,
161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947).
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sales is in that business. As noted with respect to the frequency test,
if there is a seller's market when the asset is liquidated, the sales will
produce substantial income in a short period of time. If the court is
to use this factor to deny capital gains treatment, it is subverting
the very consideration which originally gave rise to capital gains
relief. Some cases have recognized that substantiality of income is
important only if it shows there was also a substantial amount of time
and activity expended by the taxpayer in making his sales.' 2°
A strong indication of investment liquidation meriting capital
asset treatment occurs when the taxpayer is compelled to sell by some
external circumstances, such as a pressing need for funds in general,'
12
the need to support the owner in illness or old age122 or to liquidate a
partnership on the death of a partner, 12 where sale is forced by a
threat of condemnation, 24 where pressure is exerted by the owner's
creditors for more liquidity in his assets,'125 or where the investment
value of the land is lessened by a restrictive covenant 2 6 or by zon-
ing restrictions. 27
CONCLUSION
Judicial analysis of the factors has yielded a loose web of decisions
with generally erratic seams. Except in polar situations, tax results
in this area are difficult and sometimes almost impossible to predict
to the dismay of the taxpayer and his advisers.
Changes in the law of real estate capital gains taxation are a dis-
tinct possibility. According to Mr. Surrey, the Treasury Department
and its computers are endeavoring to discover what does happen in
real estate transactions.' 8 What direction changes might take is un-
known. Perhaps one will not be accused of being overly cynical if he
expects little improvement and increasingly complex legislation. Past
statutory attempts at providing certainty or simplification, as exem-
plified by sections 1237 (subdividing), 341 (collapsible corporations),
and a host of other Code sections, do not encourage optimism.
Pending legislative reform, or perhaps only change, the case by
case, common law, approach will continue. History offers scant hope,
but the courts may fashion some improvements. One would be to
take the initiative and distinguish, as to a single property, between
120. Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Crosswhite v. United
States, 369 F.2d 989 (Ct. Cl. 1966). But see Miller v. United States, 339 F.2d 661
(Ct. Cl. 1964).
121. But an increase in property taxes has been held insufficient to support the
owner's contention that he was liquidating. L. P. Barney, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109(1967); Martin Dressen, 17 T.C. 1443 (1952); H. D. Lewis, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
80 (1952).
122. Austin v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1953); Estate of
Douglas S. Mackall, Sr., 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 701 (1944).
123. Estate of W. D. Haden, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 825 (1953).
124. Maudine Neese, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1058 (1953); Louis J. Hexter, 11
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 337 (1952).
125. Claude M. Ferguson, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 243 (1950).
126. Freida E. J. Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946).
127. P. S. Edwards, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1045 (1953).
128. Conference on Impact of Computers on Tax Practice, George Washington
University, June 9-10, 1966.
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that portion of value growth representing general appreciation and
deserving capital gains treatment and that part of value growth attribu-
table to business activities of the owner and justifying ordinary in-
come treatment.
The advisor and his client-owner will have to predict as best they
can, using checklists of "good" and "bad" factors such as developed
in this article. Lest they be overwhelmed with the idea of a crusade
for certainty, let -them remember that legislative changes will probably
bring more restrictions than relief.
The advisor and his client may also, out of prudence or fear,
begin considering different ways of handling transactions in order to
avoid or delay the dealership issue. Some of these other possibilities,
requiring many additional articles for full development, are:
1. The use of land leases, possibly followed by loans made on
the security of the lease. Be aware, however, of section 1055, the
so-called Friedel amendment, dealing with ground rents.
2. Exchanges of real property for real property under sec-
tion 1031.
3. Contribution of appreciated property to partnerships or cor-
porations in a tax-free manner, so as to pool interests, thus facilitating
diversification or development. In some situations, corporate stock
may subsequently be exchanged, in a tax-free reorganization, for stock
of a publicly traded corporation.
4. For older taxpayers, borrowing on the property and holding
it until death, when it achieves a stepped-up basis for income tax pur-
poses, may be helpful.
5. Selling property on an installment basis under section 453
will at least spread the burden should ordinary income be realized.
Income averaging under section 1301 offers another vehicle for relief.
In summary, -tax life in the real estate area will remain risky
and relatively unpredictable. Seekers of capital gains must be prepared
to use imagination and to assume these risks.
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